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Abstract
This paper deals with strategic behaviour of firms in a duopoly, subsequent to the
claim by one firm that it has reduced the unit cost of production. A variety of possible
strategic equilibria are discussed in the context of a duopoly game between a multina-
tional and a local firm. In the context of an extended uniform period of patenting, as fi-
nally agreed in the Uruguay round (1994), firms have increased incentive to take patents.
In the presence of cost differences, the act of taking process-patents has implications for
the equilibrium output strategies of the duopoly firms and sometimes may have a negative
overall welfare effect for the local producer and consumers.
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1 Introduction
The Final Act of the Uruguay Round laid down the regulations on patenting rights as a part
of the TRIP (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement. This established a uni-
form patenting period (both for final products and the processes) of 20 years for the member
countries. For many developing countries this meant a considerable extension of the existing
patenting period. This extension of the patenting period was opposed by several developing
countries. In the end, it was accepted as a part of the final agreement which, on the whole,
was believed to offer a better prospect for the trading world. The developing countries were
allowed a reasonable period to adjust their patent laws to suit the agreement. The arguments
in favour of and against patenting or an extension of the patenting period are well known (e.g.,
see Penrose, 1973) and are not repeated here. In this paper we examine a possible implication
of the extension of the period of process patenting affecting the producers and consumers of
a developing economy.
The decision to take a patent depends on a number of variables. However, it is well agreed
by economists that the length of patenting period is a major factor affecting the decision to
take a patent. A longer period of patenting encourages cost-efficient multinationals to take
patents on production processes and increases available information in the market to fence
off competition from less-efficient producers. When the period of patenting is short, firms
may prefer secrecy to patents (see Lunn, 1987). For example, the Indian government took
a drastic measure in 1970 to reduce the patenting period and abolished product patents on
chemical products causing a substantial drop in the rate of patenting (see Bagchi et al., 1984;
Deolalikar & Ro¨ller, 1989).
However, the change in the level of information resulting from a patent may affect the
market in such a way that both the producers and consumers in a developing country are
worse off. This paper demonstrates this possibility in the context of a duopoly model with
asymmetric information on costs. Sakai (1985), following Ponssard (1976, 1979), points
out that in a Cournot duopoly with incomplete cost information, the value of information
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to a firm may be negative. For a similar result see Gal-Or (1988). Mirman et al. (1994)
point out that, in the presence of demand uncertainties, the duopoly firms may gain through
manipulating information by giving false signals. Mirman et al. (1993) discuss the problem of
signal jamming. This paper builds on the idea that the possibility of information manipulation
through output signalling may result in a pooling equilibrium from which the local firms in
a developing economy may profit. A longer period of patenting will increase the possibility
of patenting by relatively cost-efficient multinationals, thereby providing more information
regarding the process of production and the production costs of the multinationals. In the
context of a Cournot duopoly with a negative value of information, this may have adverse
effects on the producers and consumers in a developing economy.
2 The Model
Consider a developing country where two firms, a local firm (Firm 1) and a multinational
corporation (Firm 2), sell an identical product.(Firm 2 is called a multinational firm because
we want to relate our discussion to the process patenting issue. Otherwise, Firm 2 could be
any other firm.) The inverse demand function for the product is given by, p = a− bx, where
p is the price and x = ∑i xi (i = 1,2) is the total quantity produced and sold in the market.
Initially, we assume that the unit costs of production are identical and constant, c, for both
firms. Further, assuming both firms behave as Cournot duopolists under full information, the
profit function for firm i is,
pii = xi[a−b(xi+ x j)− c], (i 6= j = 1,2). (1)
The equilibrium output of each firm is:
xi(0) =
(a− c)
3b
, (i = 1,2). (2)
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It follows that total output sold in the market is, x(0) = 2(a− c)/3b , and the profit of each
firm is, pii(0) = (a− c)2/9b . We refer to this equilibrium as E(0).
We assume that under complete information both firms use the equilibrium (Cournot-
Nash) strategy. In the absence of complete information, the local firm (Firm 1) always sets
its output at the level which maximizes its expected profit. If information on unit cost is
asymmetric, the local firm does not adjust its output as a myopic profit maximizer. If it does
so, the multinational, with unchanged unit cost, may drive the market to equilibrium, E(2)
(the equilibrium under which both firms behave as if Firm 2 has been successful in reducing
its cost), through bluffing. The local firm knows this. Hence, it maximizes expected profit
given its belief. Therefore, the market may be driven to an equilibrium which is not Markov-
perfect. The local firm revises its belief only when the multinational’s output-signal convinces
the local firm that such a signal cannot be a result of bluffing. We assume that the firms adjust
their outputs in the following sequence. Firm 2 (the multinational) announces that, because
of technological invention and efficiency gains, it has been able to reduce its cost from c to
c− δ (which could be stated in percentage terms), in an effort to force Firm 1 to revise its
output level so that Firm 2 will gain from the revision. In response, Firm 1 sets its output
first and Firm 2 responds with its best reply. Then Firm 1 moves again and the game goes on
until equilibrium is reached. In other words, the firms are engaged in an infinitely repeated
sequential game. Each period consists of a move from the local firm and a response from
the multinational. The reader should note the difference from a repeated leadership game,
where the multinational always plays the role of a follower maximizing its current profit.
The multinational does not always maximize its current profit given the output of the local
firm. It can adopt a bluffing output signal with a hope of gaining in the long-run (avoiding
a return to equilibrium E(0)). This is a follower-follower Cournot game with possible false
output signalling. A long-run equilibrium is a state which is repeated indefinitely given the
parameters of the game. We define the transitory equilibrium as the configuration (x1,x2)
which represents the first moves of both the firms under asymmetric cost information.
Suppose, there is a possibility that the multinational may have actually invented a new
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technique of production reducing its unit cost to c− δ . However, the local firm is not sure
whether the multinational has actually improved the process of production or not. If the period
of patenting seems to be too short for Firm 2, even if it has actually been able to reduce the
cost, it may not be willing to take a patent of the new technology because of the fear that the
local firm will simply copy it after a short period. When its true unit cost is c, for a given xi,
the reaction function of Firm 2 is,
x2 =
(a− c−bx1)
2b
. (3)
When the multinational is successful in reducing the unit cost, its reaction function is,
x′2 =
(a− c+δ−bx1)
2b
. (4)
Suppose the local firm places a probability λ on the event that the multinational has been
able to reduce the unit cost. Its expected profit for a given x1 is,
E(pi1) = (1−λ)[{a−b(x1+ x2)− c}x1]+λ[{a−b(x1+ x′2)− c+δ}x1]. (5)
Since Firm 1 maximizes its expected profit under asymmetric information, it produces,
x1(1) =
(a− c)
3b
− λδ
3b
. (6)
Consequently, Firm 2 produces either,
x2(1) =
(a− c)
3b
+
λδ
6b
, (7)
in the absence of any technological improvement, or,
x′2(1) =
(a− c+2δ)
3b
− (1−λ)δ
6b
. (8)
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Either (x1(1),x2(1)) or (x1(1),x′2(1)) represents equilibrium E(1). Gibbons (1992) discusses
Eqs.(6) - (8) as one-period solutions of the Cournot game with asymmetric cost information.
We shall show that in an infinitely repeated Cournot game Eqs.(6) and (7) yield only a tran-
sitory (one-period) equilibrium not a long-run equilibrium. Only under restrictive conditions
may Eqs.(6) and (8) yield a long-run equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In the infinitely repeated Cournot game with imperfect information the out-
come (x1(1),x2(1)) can only be a transitory equilibrium which represents only the initial
response of Firm 2.
Proof. Clearly, Firm 1 is producing less than what it would produce in equilibrium E(0).
Firm 2 has a larger share of the market because of cost uncertainty. If the multinational sets
x2 according to Eq.(7), the total output sold in the market is smaller in amount and the price is
higher. The local firm’s profit goes down in spite of the higher price, because of a drop in its
output. The amount of its loss is, (λδ/18b)(a−c+λδ). On the other hand, the multinational’s
profit increases because of a higher price and larger output. However, if the multinational sets
x2 according to Eq.(7), the local firm realizes that Firm 2 has not been able to reduce its cost,
so in the next period it sets λ = 0 and the Nash equilibrium is restored as a full (complete)
information equilibrium and is given by Eq.(2).
Instead of myopic profit maximization, the multinational, not successful in reducing unit
cost, can take a long-term view. For example, it may be tempted to give a false signal by
pretending that it has actually reduced the cost of production by δ and set x2 = x′2(1), provided
it is profitable for the firm in the long-run. Obviously, in case the multinational has actually
been able to reduce its cost it would also signal it by setting x2 = x′2. For the sake of brevity,
Firm 2 will be referred to as F∗2 if it has been able to reduce the unit cost. Otherwise, if Firm
2 has not been able to reduce the unit cost, we shall refer to it as F2.
When the local firm is convinced that the multinational has actually been able to reduce
the unit cost and is not bluffing, the local firm and F∗2 would move to the long-run equilibrium
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E(2) where the values of x1 , x2 and x are given by:
x1(2) =
(a− c)
3b
− δ
3b
,
x2(2) =
(a− c)
3b
+
2δ
3b
,
x(2) = x1(2)+ x2(2) =
2(a− c)
3b
+
δ
3b
.
(9)
F2, giving a false output signal, will move to E(2) only if it is profitable for it to do so. We
shall analyse this case in detail. In the long-run, the multinational sells a larger amount of
output in the market. However, since the total output is larger but the price is lower, F2 may
actually suffer a loss in profit in the long-run equilibrium E(2)) by giving a false signal.
Lemma 1. F2 may have a long-run incentive to falsely signal that it has achieved a cost
reduction by setting output at x′2(1) if and only if δ < (a− c)/2 and no incentive to give a
false signal if δ≥ (a− c)/2 in the long-run.
Proof. Under a false signal, the change in the long-run profit of F2 from equilibrium E(0) is:
[δ(a− c)−2δ2]/9b. If it is positive, F2 has a long-run reason to give a false signal by setting
its output to x′2(1). This implies that F2 may give a false signal if, δ< (a−c)/2. On the other
hand, if δ≥ (a− c)/2, F2 will have no incentive to give a false signal in the long-run.
This is important for the local firm. It knows that if δ ≥ (a− c)/2, the multinational’s
output response is not a bluff in the long-run. The next proposition further strengthens the
result.
Proposition 2. If δ ≥ (a− c)/2, F2 has no incentive to give a false signal either in the long-
run or in the short-run. Therefore, in this case, either E(0) or E(2) will prevail as the long-run
equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 1, F2 does not have any long-run incentive to keep on giving a false signal
and move to E(2). When it has not been able to reduce the cost, it also loses by giving a false
output signal in E(1). It is easy to check, x′2(1)< x2(2). However, total output x1(1)+x
′
2(1)>
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x(2). This implies that in E(1) the price is lower than the price in E(2). Consequently the unit
profit is lower in E(1) than in E(2). Since the output of Firm 2 is also lower in E(1), the total
profit of Firm 2 must also be lower in comparison with E(2). By Lemma 1, it is not profitable
for F2 to keep on giving a false output signal and move to E(2). Therefore, it is also not
profitable for F2, to give a false signal and move to E(1). In this case, F2 does not gain either
in the short-run or in the long-run by giving a false output signal. Note, though F∗2 incurs
a lower profit in E(1) than in E(2), in both equilibria F∗2 enjoys higher profits than in E(0).
When δ ≥ (a− c)/2 we have an information generated separated equilibrium. If x1 and x2
are determined by Eqs.(6) and (7) in the transitory period, then the long-run equilibrium E(0)
prevails with F1 and F2. If x1 and x2 are determined by Eqs.(6) and (8) in the transitory period,
in the next move, Firm 1 will set λ = 1 and the firms, F1 and F∗2 will move to the long-run
equilibrium E(2).
When the envisaged reduction in unit cost is small, δ < (a− c)/2, Firm 1 knows that
F2 will bluff (i.e., produce x′2(1)), in order to persuade it that F2 has actually been able to
reduce the unit cost, so that in the long-run equilibrium E(2) prevails. Of course, F∗2 will
also produce the quantity x′2(1). We have the possibility for a case of pooled equilibrium
due to lack of information. From the response of the multinational, the local firm cannot be
sure whether the multinational has actually been able to cut the unit cost. Hence, the local
firm’s output will continue to be determined by Eq.(6). This creates a problem for F∗2 . It will
continue responding with the output level x′2(1), but the local firm cannot be made to believe
that it has actually reduced the unit cost. For F∗2 , the configuration
x1(1) =
(a− c)
3b
− λδ
3b
,
x′2(1) =
a− c+2δ
3b
− [(1−λ]δ
6b
.
(10)
is the Nash equilibrium under asymmetric information when δ< (a− c)/2.
The local firm’s profit level is lower (by the amount δ2/9b) in the full information Nash
equilibrium E(2) characterized by Eq.(9) as compared to the Nash equilibrium under asym-
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metric information given by Eq.(10). In this case, the value of information is negative for the
local firm (Sakai, 1985). Therefore, unless F1 is fully convinced that Firm 2 has been able to
reduce its cost, it will produce x1(1) rather than x1(2). On the other hand, F∗2 is better off,
if F1 produces x1(2) rather than x1(1). If it could convince the local firm about the truth of
the reduction in cost without revealing the details of the technological change, it would do
so. Without a long-term process patenting accepted, F∗2 prefers not to reveal the details of the
change in the process of production and keep the process as a secret.
Let us further explore the case when δ < (a− c)/2. It may seem possible for both firms
to be in a long-run equilibrium E(1) where the Firm 2, which has actually not been able to
reduce its cost, bluffs its way in.
Proposition 3. If F2 produces x′2(1), its profit is greater than what it would earn in the full
information equilibrium E(0), if and only if,
δ<
[4λ(a− c)]
9−λ2 . (11)
Therefore, if Eq.(11) holds, the multinational will always bluff and the long-run equilibrium
is (x1(1),x′2(1)).
Proof. It is easy to check that in this case δ< (a−c)/2. We have to show that pi′2(1)> pi2(0)
for F2, if Eq.(11) holds. When δ < (a− c)/2, Firm 1 knows that Firm 2 may give a false
signal to lure it to equilibrium E(2). Therefore, its response is x1(1), though the output of
Firm 2 is x′2(1). The total output is, x
′(1) = 2(a− c)/3+ δ/(2b)+λδ/(6b) and the price is
p′(1) = a−2(a− c)/3−δ/2+λδ/6. The change in the profit from E(0) is:
pi′2(1)−pi2(0) = x′2(1)(p′(1)− c)−
(a− c)2
9b
=
λδ(a− c)
9b
− δ
2
4b
+
λ2δ2
36b
.
For the change of profit to be positive, the above expression must be positive which requires,
4λ(a−c)> δ(9−λ2) implying δ< [4λ(a−c)]/(9−λ2). In this case, F2 will always bluff and
the long-run equilibrium is (x1(1),x′2(1)). In this case, the F1 is unable to determine whether
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Firm 2 has been able to reduce the unit cost or not.
The case when (a− c)/2 > δ≥ [4λ(a− c)]/(9−λ2) is interesting. F2 knows that F1 will
always produce x1(1) because of the possibility of false signalling. Hence it will like to play
x2(1) in the first round for temporary gain and then both players should move back to the
initial equilibrium E(0).
In Tables 1 and 2, the results have been summarized. The value of δ can fall in three
different ranges. The upper limit of the first range is δ1 = [4λ(a− c)]/(9−λ2). The upper
limit of the second range is δ2 = (a− c)/2. The upper limit of δ in the third range is c.
Insert Tables 1& 2 Here
In the context of a pooling equilibrium due to the lack of sufficient information, F∗2 may
wish to send output signal to the local firm that it is has actually been able to reduce unit cost
and is not bluffing. The next proposition states that no such signalling mechanism is available
to F∗2 in the context of an infinitely repetitive game without time discounting.
Proposition 4. When δ1 ≤ δ < δ2, no output signalling mechanism is available to F∗2 to
convince F1 that it has been able to reduce the unit cost, in the context of a repetitive game
without time discounting. In this case, both the transitory and the long-run equilibrium for
(F1,F2) is (x1(1),x′2(1)).
Proof. The local firm wishes to be in the equilibrium (x1(1),x′2(1)) rather than in equilibrium
E(2), unless it is convinced that the multinational has, indeed, been able to reduce the unit
cost. Suppose, there exists an output signalling profile x2(t) for F∗2 , which after a period T,
persuades the local firm to accept equilibrium E(2). Then it is also preferred to equilibrium
E(0) by F2, since the sum of finite gains in profit over the remaining infinite time horizon is
greater than the sum of finite losses over a finite period. Knowing this, F1 will always play
x1(1) and the pooling equilibrium (x1(1),x′2(1)) will prevail.
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When both firms are discounting profits and maximising the sum of discounted profits
which is common knowledge, it is possible for F∗2 to convince F1 that it has actually reduced
the unit cost.
Proposition 5. Consider the case δ1 ≤ δ < δ2. If both firms are maximizing the sum of
discounted profits with α as the discounting factor which is common knowledge, then it is
possible for F∗2 to find an output signalling profile x2(t) which, after a period T , must convince
the local firm that the multinational has successfully reduced the unit cost.
Proof. If F∗2 always produces x
′
2(1) in the absence of any discounting of profits, the profit
difference from equilibrium E(0) is positive in each period. For F2, the profit difference is
negative. Let us define T as the minimum time horizon when the discounted sum of difference
in profits over the infinite horizon for F2 is negative if at T , both firms move to equilibrium
E(2). Clearly, when F∗2 is producing x
′
2(1) for T periods, it is recognized that the multinational
has successfully reduced its cost and both firms move to equilibrium E(2). The signalling
strategy mentioned here is myopic. It is not necessarily the optimal output signalling strategy.
The optimal signalling strategy x2(t), when δ1 ≤ δ< δ2, is given by:
max
x2(t)
T
∑
t=0
αtpi∗2(x1(t),x2(t))+
∞
∑
t=T
αtpi∗2(x1(2),x2(2)), 0 < α< 1,
T = min{τ|
τ
∑
t=0
αt∆pi2(x1(1),x2(t))+
∞
∑
t=τ
αt∆pi2(x1(2),x2(2))≤ 0}.
pi∗2(.) is the profit in each period if the multinational is F
∗
2 . Similarly, pi2 is the profit per period
if the multinational F2. ∆pi2(.) denotes the deviation of pi2 from its value in the equilibrium
E(0). Given the output signal x2(t), T is the period, when F1 will agree to switch to equilibrium
E(2). However it remains true that the multinational will be better off if it could convince the
local firm in the first round that it has, indeed, been able to reduce the unit cost.
In the case of 0 < δ< δ1, the story is more complicated and a profitable output signalling
profile may not exist. In this case, whether the multinational is successful or not (F2 or F∗2 ),
it enjoys a higher profit at x′2(1) in comparison with equilibrium E(0). F
∗
2 obviously enjoys a
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higher profit than F2. In order to convince the local firm of its success, F∗2 may choose a level
of output x2 > x′2(1) which will yield a negative profit difference to F2 but for F
∗
2 the profit
difference is non-negative, though F∗2 will be worse off in comparison with the output config-
uration (x1(1),x′2(1)). In case of time discounting, for F2 there must exist a T after which, if
it continues with the same output level, the discounted sum of the profit differences will be
negative if it were F2. Therefore, if F∗2 carries on producing x2 beyond period T , it should give
the local firm a clear signal that the multinational has been successful in reducing its costs and
both firms will move to the full information equilibrium E(2). However, up to period T , F∗2 is
sacrificing a part of its profit (with respect to the configuration (x1(1),x′2(1)) in order to con-
vince the local firm that it has been able to reduce unit cost. If the cost is greater than the gain
from the ultimate move to equilibrium E(2), then the long-run equilibrium under asymmetric
cost information, (x1(1),x′2(1))will prevail. The multinational will have no incentive to signal
its success. If the cost is less than the gain, signalling will take place and ultimately both firms
will move to the full information equilibrium E(2). Obviously, the parameters of the system,
δ and α play a crucial role in determining whether it is profitable for the multinational to try
to achieve equilibrium E(2) through output signalling.
3 Firms’ Strategic Behaviour and Process Patenting
The issue of patenting was put in the agenda for an intense international debate in the Uruguay
round (1986-94) initiated by the Dunkel Draft (Chowdhry & Aggarwal, 1994). Patents can
be granted on the final product as well as on the production process. Some countries usually
allowed patents on the production process but seldom on the final product in certain indus-
tries, unless the product is uniquely related to the process of production. It was feared that
patenting of the final product would stifle competition and act as a barrier to improvements in
the production technology and to a reduction in the cost of production.
In the presence of competitors, a reduction in cost is reflected in a reduction of price and
an increase in consumer surplus. This issue was important in the context of medicine. For
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example, it was argued by the local pharmaceutical companies in India, by inventing new
processes of production, were able to reduce the cost of some drugs significantly. This was
important for the vast multitude of poverty stricken people in India. However, in the absence of
strict enforcement of patenting, the Indian pharmaceutical market was also full of counterfeit
products which were dangerous to the health of the patients. Moreover, it is more likely that
in the competition for cost reduction, the multinationals with a much higher R&D spending
capability should be able to reduce the cost more effectively than relatively under-financed
local pharmaceutical companies.
During the debate on the Dunkel draft, the local pharmaceutical firms in India argued
that without competition, the multinationals would not invest in R&D to reduce the cost of
production. However, the case for process patenting was far less controversial. The argument
was about the length of the period for process patenting. The patenting period also varies
between countries. Many developing countries have a short patenting period. In the 1970 Act,
India reduced the patenting period from 16 to 14 years in general. For medicine it was reduced
to 7 years. There was no product patent available for chemicals. The Dunkel Draft proposed
a patent period of 20 years for both the process and the product directly obtained through the
process. This was finally accepted in the Final Act of 1994 with some important exceptions.
USA (with the tacit consent of the G-7 countries) was widely accused of twisting the arms of
the developing countries to accept what virtually was the Dunkel Draft. The main argument
in favour of extending the period of patent to 20 years was that unless sufficient protection is
granted under the intellectual property rights (IPR), the multinationals would not be interested
in investing large sums of money in R&D to invent new products or to improve the existing
technology of production.
In some areas like medicine, bio-technology (Acharya, 1991) and communications, it is
absolutely important to keep up the momentum for progress. This cannot be disputed. How-
ever, there is an aspect of process patenting which has not been well-recognised in the liter-
ature. Quite often the technology of production cannot be identified from the final product.
Such products are produced by different producers, with different technologies of production,
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without obtaining relevant patents. Quite often secrecy is preferred to patenting (Lunn, 1987).
If patents are granted only for a short period, it is not desirable to obtain patents for processes
and disclose the technology of production. It is better to keep it as a secret. In such cases the
information on the cost of production or the state of technology is asymmetric. However, it has
a cost to the firm using more efficient technology (the multinational in our case). If the long-
run market equilibrium in the duopoly model is (x1(1),x′2(1)), the multinational, successful
in reducing its unit cost, earns less than what it could earn in the full information equilibrium
E(2). With profit discounting, even when the firms ultimately move to equilibrium E(2), Firm
2 may have earned a low profit for a substantial period in its effort to signal its success.
With a long period for process patenting, the multinational patents its process to convince
its rival of its relative production efficiency. But this information has a negative value to the
local producer. The market will move to equilibrium E(2), where the local producer is worse
off and the multinational is better off. Thus, an extension of the period of process patent-
ing may interfere with the long-run equilibrium given the strategic behaviour of the firms.
It is expected that the multinationals with large scale investments in R&D employ, in gen-
eral, more efficient technologies. Therefore, a substantial extension of the period of process
patenting under the TRIP agreement in the Final Act of 1994, gives a strategic advantage to
the multinationals operating in the underdeveloped countries.
An important question is whether the consumers in the developing country are better off
in the full information equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Both the consumers and the local producer are worse off atE(2) in comparison
with E(1) implying a negative overall effect of the full information equilibrium.
Proof. We have already noted that the local producer is worse off at E(2). The consumers in
the market are better off in the full information equilibrium if:
x1(2)+ x2(2)> x1(1)+ x′2(1) ⇒
δ
3b
>
δ
2b
− λδ
6b
⇒ 2 > 3−λ.
Since 0 < λ< 1, this is not possible. Hence, under the full information equilibrium, the total
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output produced is less and the price of the product is higher in comparison with the long-run
equilibrium (x1(1),x′2(1)). The consumers in the market are better off in the equilibrium under
asymmetric information than in the equilibrium with full information. In the full information
equilibrium, not only do the local producers earn a smaller profit, the consumers’ surplus is
also smaller because of a smaller amount of product sold in the duopoly market with a higher
price.
4 Concluding Remarks
Whether an extension of the patenting period benefits developing countries in the long-run
is a controversial issue. Some people believe that an extension of the period of patents will
encourage local firms to invest more in R&D and increase their efficiency. There are others
who believe that it will hurt the local firms. Bureaucracy had always been a problem for
taking patents. The cost of taking patents on products in developed countries, particularly
in the USA is prohibitive for the firms in developing countries. Time will tell whether the
fears of the developing countries are well founded or not. This paper only deals with the
effect of new information, generated by the extension of the patenting period of processes,
on the producers and consumers in a developing economy. We have chosen the Cournot
model with asymmetric information as the backbone of our analysis. Bonanno & Haworth
(1998) compare the relative suitability of the Cournot and Bertrand models for analysing the
behaviour of patenting by firms. They concluded that the Cournot model is a better model for
analysing process patenting whereas the Bertrand model is more suitable for the analysis of
product patenting. Finally, there is a question of economic justice involved in our discussion.
Some may argue that it is fair that the full information equilibrium should prevail and firms
should get what they deserve. On the other hand, some would argue that a deal which makes
a third world country worse off is not a fair deal. The Final Act of the Uruguay round sought
a balance. It will take some time for the trading world to realize its full implications
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Table 1: The Transitory Equilibrium
Firms 0 < δ< δ1 δ1 ≤ δ< δ2 δ2 ≤ δ≤ c
(F1,F2) x1(1),x′2(1) x1(1),x2(1) x1(1),x2(1)
(F1,F∗2 ) x1(1),x
′
2(1) x1(1),x
′
2(1) x1(1),x
′
2(1)
Table 2: The Long-Run Equilibrium
Firms 0 < δ< δ1 δ1 ≤ δ< δ2 δ2 ≤ δ≤ c
(F1,F2) x1(1),x′2(1) x1(0),x2(0) x1(0),x2(0)
(F1,F∗2 ) x1(1),x
′
2(1) x1(1),x
′
2(1) x1(2),x2(2)
F1: Local Firm; F2: Multinational with unit cost, c; F∗2 : Multinational with unit cost, c−δ;
δ1 = [4λ(a−c)]9−λ2 ; δ2 =
(a−c)
2 .
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